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SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
NORTH CAROLINA LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN
DALE

A.

WHRITMAN*

The recent opinions of the North Carolina appellate courts include a
strikingly large proportion of eminent-domain cases. Two factors combine
to explain the unusual frequency with which these cases are tried and
appealed. The first is the elaborate activity of the federal government in
funding local and state projects involving the acquisition of land. The
Interstate Highway program1 probably accounts for the predominant
portion of this activity, with other shares attributable to urban renewal,'
public housing,' and airport improvement. 4 When the more traditional
activities of local government, such as street-widening and other public
improvements, are added to the above list, eminent domain assumes a
major role in the spectrum of litigation in state courts.
The second factor explaining the large number of eminent-domain
cases, and one that probably accounts for many appeals that would not
otherwise be taken, is the morass of divergent procedures that may be
used by governmental entities in North Carolina to acquire land. The
perplexities arising from this lack of procedural uniformity have been
previously documented. 5 Because nice questions of procedure that may
be litigated on appeal by one condemnor do not necessarily apply in actions
brought by other types of governmental units, the law develops slowly
and uncertainly, with a good deal of needless expenditure of legal talent
and fees.
PROCEDURAL DIFFICULTIES

North Carolina State Highway Commission v. Matthis6 illustrates
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law. This
survey was prepared in cooperation with the North Carolina Law Center.
I Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, 23 U.S.C. §§ 101-36 (1964).
'Housing Act of 1949, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1450-65 (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1450-69c (Supp. IV 1965-68).
8 United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401-36 (1964).
'Federal Airport Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1101-19 (1964).
Phay, The Eminent Domain Procedureof North Carolina:The Need for Legislative Action, 45 N.C.L. REv. 587 (1967). Professor Phay states that there are
eighteen separate procedures of general applicability, plus numerous procedures
contained
special
and35in (1968).
city charters.
'2 N.C.in App.
233,legislation
163 S.E.2d

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

the nature of the procedural difficulties which may be encountered. A
brief discussion of the case's statutory background may be helpful. Prior
to 1960, the Highway Commission utilized the provisions of chapter 40
of the North Carolina General Statutes 7 as the procedure for highway
takings. Effective July 1, .1960, article 9 of chapter 1368 became the
procedural framework for the Highway Commission's takings; chapter 40
remains in effect for use by a wide variety of other governmental units.'
Under chapter 40, the condemnor's petition must state that "the corporation has not been able to acquire title [to the land], and the reason of
such inability."'" The absence of such an allegation has been held to be
a jurisdictional defect rendering the complaint subject to dismissal at any
time." The general provision of chapter 136 giving condemnation powers
to the Highway Commission also presupposes failure of voluntary acquisition efforts:
Whenever the Commission and the owner or owners of the lands
. . . are unable to agree as to the price thereof, the Commission is
hereby vested with the power to condemn the lands ... and2 procedure
of article 9 of this chapter shall be used by it exclusively.'
However, article 9 of chapter 136 begins with a section listing in detail
the allegations and statements that must be contained in the complaint and
the declaration of taking to be filed by the Highway Commission,"8 and
there is no requirement that the Commission allege inability to acquire
the land by private negotiation.
In Matthis the Commission's complaint and declaration made no
mention of any prior attempt to purchase the property. On appeal from
a jury trial, the defendant condemnee argued, apparently for the first
time, that the absence of such an allegation rendered the entire proceedings below without jurisdiction and urged that the complaint be dismissed.
7

N.C. GEN.

STAT. §§

40-1 to -53, (1966).

' N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 136-103 to -121 (1964).
GEN. STAT. § 40-2 (1966).
'N.C.
"0N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-12 (1966). The new rules of civil procedure do not
control condemnation pleading in cases in which specific eminent domain statutes

apply. N.C.R. Civ. P. 1.
"Red Slrings City Bd. of Educ. v. McMillan, 250 N.C. 485, 108 S.E.2d 895
(1959) ; City of Winston-Salem v. Ashby, 194 N.C. 388, 139 S.E. 764 (1927). See
N.C.R. Civ. P. 12(h)*(3): "Whenever it appears ... that the court lacks jurisdic-.
tion 0of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action."
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-19 (1964).
3
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-103 (1964).
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The court of appeals concluded that the absent allegation made the complaint "a defective statement of a good cause of action" ;14 the defect was,
however, held to be non-jurisdictional, and while the defendants might
have originally demurred and forced an amendment of the complaint, they
had waived any objection by (1) filing an answer admitting the power
of the Commission to condemn the land, and (2) by withdrawing the
sum paid into court by the Commission as its estimate of just compensation. 5
A short time later the same court reached a different result in City
of Charlotte v. Robinson,1" in which the city was proceeding under a
charter power that incorporated article 9 of chapter 136 by reference.
In their answer the condemnees raised the absence of an allegation of
prior attempts to acquire the property by negotiation. Because the question had been timely raised, the court of appeals held that the complaint
should be dismissed with leave to amend and also found that the defendants
were entitled to an order restraining the city from taking their property
before a sufficient amended complaint was filed.
Thus this little controversy over the allegation of prior negotiation has
been resolved, at least on the facts presented in Matthis and Robinson.
But it is not difficult to imagine factual variants of these cases that will
require still further appellate litigation. It is certainly arguable that in
cases in which a specific statute sets forth the necessary allegations of a
complaint, a holding that further allegations are requried for a good
statement of a cause of action is needless formalism and achieves nothing
more than an opportunity for the condemnee's attorney to wear down the
state with technicality.
But the more fundamental criticism of these cases is simply that no
condemnee's attorney should have the opportunity to consume his client's
money and the time of the state's attorney and the court of appeals in
litigating such trivia. This problem is, unfortunately, not amenable to
judicial solution. It is intrinsic in the existence of the present hodgepodge
of eminent domain procedures and can be solved only by the General
Assembly. An attack on this problem is incumbent upon that body during
its next session.
' North Carolina State Hwy. Comm'n v. Matthis, 2 N.C. App. 233, 243, 163
S.E.2d 35, 41 (1968).
Id. at 243-44, 163 S.E.2d at 41-42.
2 N.C. App. 429, 163 S.E.2d 289 (1968).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

EVIDENCE OF VALUE

Time Lapse
Under North Carolina law the date on which property must be evaluated in fixing the compensation for a taking is the date on which the
taking occurred.' 7 Of course, it is rare than an appraisal is made on
precisely that date. Several recent cases have dealt with the admissibility
of evidence of value determined on other dates. In Wilson Redevelopment
Commission v. Stewart,'" the court of appeals held that appraisals made
eighteen months and forty months prior to the taking were admissible
when the evidence showed that no substantial changes had taken place
in the property or its value between the appraisals and the date of taking.
The test applied by the court was whether appraisal "fairly points to the
value of the property at the time of the taking.""
The condemnor's attorney frequently will attempt to get before the
jury evidence of the amount paid by the present owner when he acquired
the property. The condemnee would usually prefer to exclude such testimony since if he has owned the property for any length of time, the price
he paid is almost certain to be substantially lower than the damages he
seeks.2 In North Carolina State Highway Commission v. Moore,2 1 the
court of appeals held admissible the condemnee's response to the state's
attorney's cross-exmination as to the amount paid for the land some seven
years earlier. The condemnee had testified that the property and its
environs had not changed over the seven-year period. Perhaps the only
satisfactory tactic for tempering the disadvantageous impact of such a
question is for the owner to be prepared to testify plausibly that some
factors-if nothing else, the general inflation experienced by the nation's
economy-have caused the property's value to rise over the intervening
period. Such testimony might result in the sustaining of an objection
to the question of the price paid. Even if the owner is required to answer
the question, his explanation of the changed value will mitigate the impression created in the minds of the jurors. It seems unlikely that the
answer can be excluded entirely since the court of appeals in State High",
North Carolina State Hwy.& Pub. Works Comm'n v.Black, 239 N.C. 198,
79 S.E.2d 778 (1954).
183 N.C. App. 271, 164 S.E.2d 495 (1968).
" Id. at 275, 164 S.E.2d at 497.
2 See note 73 infra.
"13 N.C. App. 207, 164 S.E.2d 385 (1968).
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way Commission v. Lane22 recently held that, irrespective of the relevance

of the answer on the issue of value, the question is a proper means of
testing the witness' capacity of recollection on cross examination. In that

case, the trial judge instructed the jury that the owner's answer was not
substantive evidence but merely went to the witness' credibility. Realistically, however, such a cautionary instruction is probably worthless; the
jurors may still be unduly impressed by the low price paid by the
23

owner.

The court of appeals has dealt recently with two other sources of
opinion as to value. In State Highway Commission v. Matthis,2 the
expert appraiser first visited the property about three years after the
taking of a portion of it for highway purposes. In the meantime the
highway and embankment had already been constructed across the land.
The court held that an objection was properly sustained to a question
asking the appraiser's opinion of the fair market value of the property
prior to the taking. And in State Highway Commission v. Mode,25 it
was held erroneous to permit an expert appraiser to give an opinion of the
highest and best use of the property when that opinion was based in part
on the evidence given in the trial of the case. The ground for the holdings
in both cases seems essentially the same: even an expert witness should
not be permitted to offer an opinion of the type involved without basis in
personal knowledge.
Prospective Uses

More difficult questions arise when a witness is asked to evaluate property on the basis of a use which was not being made of the land at
the time of the taking. A rather novel example of this situation is found
225 N.C. App. 507, 168 S.E.2d 473 (1969).
"The impact of the price paid upon the jury's deliberations is suggested by the
following data from the records of Lane and Moore. In both cases, the original
cost figure shown is the owner's cost of his entire tract, prorated for the amount
of land being taken by the state.
Jury Verdict
OriginalCost
Ouner'soffer
State's offer
Lane
Moore

or testimnony

or testinony

$1700-2400
$3700

$11,633-12,030
$55,000

$1025
$1820

$3750
$5100

Although in neither case did the verdict go below the state's non-cost evidence, both
verdicts were much closer to the state's evidence (and to the original cost) than
to the owner's evidence.
242 N.C. App. 233, 163 S.E.2d 35 (1968).
252 N.C. App. 464, 163 S.E.2d 429 (1968).
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Mode,26

in State Highway Commission v.
which involved the taking of a
portion of the defendant's farm and woodland. After the taking and during
construction of the highway, the Highway Commission's grading contractor discovered in the right-of-way large quantities of valuable stone,
suitable for crushing, which had previously been unknown to all parties.
The court of appeals ruled admissible testimony regarding the value of the
stone as it affected the land, but held that the witness should not have been
permitted to arrive at the incremental value of the stone deposit by
estimating the value per ton of the stone in the ground and multiplying
by the estimated number of tons in the deposit. It is true that this method
of calculation generally has been disapproved by the courts, 7 and this
result is clearly sound in cases in which the price per ton given by the
appraiser is a severed or retail price. In Mode, however, the appraiser was
asked his opinion of the fair market value "of the merchantable stone in
the ground,"2 a matter quite different from retail value. The value of
the stone in the ground excludes, of course, any speculation about such
.uncertainties as the expense of removal and the possibility
of fluctuations
in the retail market. Only a few courts have been willing to distinguish
these two types of "value."2' 9 Because the rule against the method of
computation offered in Mode is so well settled, it is perhaps understandable that the court of appeals chose to follow it.
An issue that arises with much greater frequency is the admissibility
of evidence of value, usually offered by the condemnee's expert, based on
the site's potential for a particular type of future development; perhaps
the most common hypotheses are future residential subdivisions and shopping centers. These situations are distinguishable from the facts in Mode,
in which the land's usefulness as a stone quarry was an established and
indisputable fact; the admissibility of more speculative potential land uses
is not so predictable. In City of Statesville v. Bowles,8" the city sought
to take an easement for a sewer line which, when installed, would prohibit
grading to the depth necessary for construction of commercial buildings.
The condemnee's expert appraiser testified that in his opinon the highest
use of the land in question was as a new shopping center or as an extension
261d.

IP. NiciroLs, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 13.22[2] (J. Sackman ed.
1962).
282 N.C. App. at 469, 163 S.E.2d at 432.
29 See Iske v.
Metropolitan Util. Dist., 183 Neb. 34, 157 N.W.2d 887 (1968);
In re Appropriation of Easement, 108 Ohio App. 423, 162 N.E.2d 190 (1958).
6 N.C. App. 124, 169 S.E.2d 467 (1969).
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of an adjacent center. The land was apparently undeveloped, and the
condemnee gave no evidence of having made plans or taken any affirmati-ve
steps to develop a shopping center on the site, nor was there any evidence
that the owner of the existing adjacent shopping center had any plan or
desire to expand. Yet the court held that the testimony respecting commerical development of the site in question was not unreasonable or
speculative.
An instructive comparison may be made with North Carolina State
Highway Commission v. Matthis,Sl discussed above. The land in question
in that case was adjacent to an existing residential subdivision that had
been developed by the condemnee. The site of the taking had been graded
for residential purposes, rough streets had been cut, and a sewer line had
been installed to serve many of the proposed lots. A subdivision plat had
been prepared, but had not been placed on record at the time of the taking.
Ironically, the owner's reason for delaying the filing of the plat was that he
feared the resulting dedication of the streets, some of which fell within
the highway right-of-way being taken, would result in a denial of
compensation to him for the street sites. Relying heavily on the fact
that the plat had not been recorded and no streets had yet been dedicated, the court of appeals found the property to be a mere "paper subdivision" and sustained the trial court's refusal to permit the owner to
use the map of the subdivision to illustrate the effect upon his lots of the
highway construction.
In cases in which a landowner argues that the potential for future
development enhances the value of presently undeveloped land, the evidence he may offer can be arranged on a continuum of objectionability.
First, he may offer evidence that, for example, residental development is
the highest and best use of the property. This evidence does not depend
upon any particular steps having been taken to actually develop the property. Such testimony was admitted in Matthis without objection.
Second, the owner may offer a map or other testimony designed to
show his anticipated development of the property in order to illustrate
the impact of the state's taking. It is on this point that Matthis and Bowles
conflict. In Bowles evidence of the limitations on commercial structures
over the sewer easement Was held admissible while in Matthis the impact
of the taking on the proposed subdivision was held excludable. If any
distinction could properly have been made between the cases, it should
" 2 N.C. App. 233, 163 S.E.2d 35 (1968).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

have been in favor of admitting the plat of the subdivision in Matthis
since that map was prepared prior to and independent of the litigation,
was based on the actual work-product of engineers and surveyors, and
2
was apparently a concrete and realistic projection of the development.3
The owner in Bowles had made no such efforts to establish the suitability
of his property for a specific commercial development.
The third and most dubious category of evidence that a landowner
might offer would involve using the subdivision plat not merely for illustrative purposes but in order to assign a retail value to each lot. That
figure would be multiplied by the number of lots lost by condemnation
to yield the total damage. In order to make such a computation sensible,
it is, of course, necessary to take into account the anticipated expenses in
developing and marketing the lots of the subdivision. In cases involving
totally undeveloped land, the courts have been virtually unanimous in their
exclusion of this kind of testimony 3 on the ground that the costs of
developing and marketing are too speculative to justify their presentation
to the jury. Perhaps the objection is sound in light of today's widely
varying (mostly upward) costs in money, taxes, labor, and building materials. 4 If the landowner's evidence is based on present levels of these
expenses, his estimate of anticipated profits may be unduly optimistic. On
the other hand, rising retail land values, especially for residential lots,
may more than offset increased developmental costs.85 And the fact that
these profits are still in the future suggests that they should be discounted
to present value-that is, the date of the taking-at some appropriate interest factor. Perhaps all of the foregoing is sufficient to convince the
reader that the rule against profit-per-lot evaluation is a sound one.
Yet the application of the rule to Matthis is not as clear as the
opinion of the court of appeals suggests. The owners' attorney excepted
to the following language in the trial court's charge to the jury:
Maps of proposed subdivisions were held admissible on similar facts in
Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Morehouse Realty Co., 126 So. 2d 830 (La. App.
1961) and Iske v. Metropolitan Util. Dist., 183 Neb. 34, 157 N.W.2d 887 (1968).
See also North Carolina State Hwy. Comm'n v. Conrad, 263 N.C. 394, 139 S.E.2d
553 (1965), in which the court approved exclusion of a plat of a proposed subdivision but implied that a more professionally-drawn map might have been admissible in the trial court's discretion.
11 Barnes v. North Carolina State Hwy. Comm'n, 250 N.C. 378, 109 S.E.2d
82

219 (1959); P. NicnoLs,
man ed. 1962).
" See generally
AMERICAN CITY

THE LAw OF EMINENT DOMAIN

§ 12.3142[1] (J. Sack-

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE

(1969).

" See note 73 infra.
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[T]he expense of cleaning off and improving the land, laying out
streets and dividing it into lots, advertising and selling the same,
the holding it and paying taxes and interest until all the lots are
disposed of cannot be ignored, and is too uncertain and conjectural to
be computed.... 36
On appeal, the owners made the point that many of the expenses mentioned were not at all conjectural, but were precisely ascertainable because
they had already been paid out."7 But other expenses, not yet accrued,
would ultimately have reduced profits on sale of the lots. These expenses
included the cost of paving, curbs and gutters, and other off-site improvements and the cost of marketing the property and of holding it
during the marketing period. The difficult question, to which the court of
appeals did not address itself, is: how far must the owner go in making
actual expenditures before the remaining costs are reasonably ascertainable and the whole package can be sent to the jury? Certainly if development had progressed to the point at which, say, ten lots in a twenty-twolot subdivision had already been sold, the expenses relating to the remaining lots could be estimated with reasonable accuracy.
Under this analysis, the question whether the subdivision plat has
or has not been recorded is of trivial importance. Nevertheless, the court
of appeals in Matthis seemed to lay great stress on the non-recordation
of the plat, apparently on the ground that recording would signify a firm
commitment by the owner to proceed with development. Yet subdivision
attorneys know that recording does not lead inexorably to actual subdivision; a great many platted subdivisions have later been abandoned or
replatted. The disappointing feature of the court's treatment of the issue
of subdivision was its failure to delineate a sound analytical framework
for the guidance of the bar on the admissibility of evidence relating to
future development. The opinion simply did not answer the fundamental
questions.
DENIAL OF ACCESS TO STATE

HIGHWAYS

A large share of the highway condemnations occurring today involve
the widening of an existing right of way to accomodate a multi-lane
controlled-access highway. The abutting owner commonly loses not only
" Record at 92-93, North Carolina State Hwy. Comn'n v. Matthis, 2 N.C. App.
233, 163 S.E.2d 35 (1968).
"' Brief for Defendant Appellant at 17, North Carolina State Hwy. Comm'h v.
Matthis, 2 N.C. App. 23'3, 163 S.E.2d 35 (1968).
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a strip of his land lying alongside the existing highway, but also his
legal right of direct access to that highway. Typically the owner will
not be landlocked, but his access after the taking will be to a service or
frontage road connecting to the improved highway at a point several
thousand feet or several miles distant from his property."
The test of whether a denial of access is compensable80 is stated in
North CarolinaState Highway Commission v. Raleigh FarmersMarket,
Inc. :o " if the abutting owner is afforded reasonable access, he is not
entitled to compensation merely because of circuity of travel to reach a
particular destination ...

."41 In applying this test to various factual

patterns, the North Carolina courts have evolved a distinction based on the
nature of the remaining access in relation to the size and shape of the
land. The cases have consistently held non-compensable the denial of
direct access to a reasonably compact parcel even though the route of access
remaining may be quite long.4 2 But when the land from which the taking
occurs is widespread and the denial of access necessitates the building
by the owner of a long road on his own land in order to connect with
the outside world that portion of the land from which access has been
taken, the courts have found the taking compensable. 4 The distinction, in
effect, is whether the condemnee or the state will provide the service
road.44 In cases involving compact parcels and the supplying of the
service road by the state, the North Carolina courts have not distinguished
between agricultural or residential uses, for which a longer route of access
The Highway Commission's power to take land for widening a limited-access
GEN. STAT. § 136-89.52 (1964).
" Compensation is arguably required by statute in every case in which an

highway is derived from N.C.

abutting owner's- easement of access is injured, however slightly, by the Highway
Commission. See N.C. GEx. STAT. § 136-89.53 (1964). But neither the Commission

nor the courts have construed the statute so literally.
40-263

N.C. 622, 139 S.E.2d 904 (1965).

"Id.
at 625, 139 S.E.2d at 906.
'2 Moses v. North Carolina State Hwy. Comm'n, 261 N.C. 316, 134 S.E.2d 664,
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 930 (1964) (additional travel to motel .65 mile or 1.65 miles,
depending on direction); North Carolina State Hwy. Comm'n v. Wortman, 4 N.C.
App. 546, 167 S.E.2d 462 (1969) (additional travel of 560 feet to 4,500 feet,
depending on direction and whether inbound or outbound); North Carolina State
Hwy. Comm'n v. Rankin, 2 N.C. App. 452, 163 S.E.2d 302 (1968) (additional
travel of .70 mile).
' North Carolina State Hwy. Comm'n v. Raleigh Farmers Mkt., Inc., 263
N.C. 622, 139 S.E.2d 904 (1965) (owner would have to build road 3000 feet);
North Carolina State Hwy. Comm'n v. Yarborough, 6 N.C. App. 294, 170 S.E.2d
159 (1969) (owner would have to build road 1,858 feet).
"See North Carolina State Hwy. Comm'n v. Nuckles, 271 N.C. 1, 21, 155 S.E.2d
772, 788 (1967).
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is of little importance, and certain commercial uses such as motels, 45 upon
which a more circuitous access may have a disastrous economic impact.
When a new limited-access highway is constructed in a location where
no road previously existed, it would not seem sensible to award the condemnee damages for the denial of his right of access. Assuming that he
still has the same accessibility to other roads as previously, his net right
of access has been neither damaged nor benefited by the taking of the
new right of way across his land. Yet in North CarolinaState Highway
Commission v. North Carolina Realty Corp.,4 . the court reasoned that
since the owner of land abutting a highway has a special right of access,
the denial to him of that right, even with respect to a newly-built highway,
is a compensable taking. 7 This doctrine is strange since the purported
taking occurs earlier in time than the opening of the highway. Moreover,
the court's opinion made no explanation of the procedure for computing
the damage. Presumably the condemnee can recover the incremental
amount by which the value of his property would have been increased
if the new highway had been made freely accessible to him. Such a holding is contrary to the great weight of American authority4" and is nothing
less than a waste of state funds. 9
SUBSTITUTE CONDEMNATION

The first North Carolina decision dealing with the concept of "substitute condemnation" is North Carolina State Highway Commission v.
Asheville School, Inc.5 As a part of a highway project, the state took
a portion of the school's land and also some land from the adjacent
owner, one Mashburn. The state sought to take a small additional strip
from the school, not needed for the highway project, to provide a driveway
'o See Moses v. North Carolina State Hwy. Comm'n, 261 N.C. 316, 134 S.E.2d
664, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 930 (1964); North Carolina State Hwy. Comm'n v.
Wortman, 4 N.C. App. 546, 167 S.E.2d 462 (1969).
"4 N.C. App. 215, 166 S.E.2d 509 (1969).
"Language supporting this view is found in North Carolina State Hwy. Comm'n
v. Gasperson, 268 N.C. 453, 455, 150 S.E.2d 860, 862 (1966). But in Gasperson,
the new highway bisected the defendants' property and cut off reasonable travel
from one portion of the land to another. This situation is quite different than a
mere denial of access to the new highway itself.
" P. NIcHOLs, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 10.2211[4] (J. Sackman ed.
1962).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-89.52 (1964) provides that along new highways the
denial of rights of access "shall be considered in determining general damages." But
this language cannot reasonably be held to require compensation when no actual
injury can be shown.
'05 N.C. App. 684, 169 S.E.2d 193 (1969).
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for Mashburn's property, which otherwise would have been left landlocked
by the original taking. The school attacked the condemnation of its land
for the driveway as being an unconstitutional taking for a private purpose.5 '
The court of appeals held the taking for the Mashburn driveway
"within the scope" of the public project, and therefore, constitutional.
The court also held the taking within statutory authority. The court relied
on a provision of the General Statutes giving the Highway Commission
authority "to acquire . . .a sufficient amount of land . . . as it may
determine to enable it to properly prosecute the work ... .*"" The con-

struction seems strained in this case since the drafters of the statutory
language probably contemplated the taking of land for the storage of
equipment, for the dumping of excess earth, and for drainage culverts or
the like. The taking of the driveway in this case was not strictly necessary, but it saved the state a good deal of money, as evidenced by one
of the state's witnesses who testified that Mashburn was paid only 8,300
dollars for his property whereas he might have been entitled to as much
as forty thousand dollars if the state had not provided the driveway for
him.
While few courts have had difficulty finding substitute condemnation
constitutional, a fair number of them have foundered over the lack of
specific statutory authority.5 3 The court of appeals in Asheville School
brought the taking within the statute by arguing that the state had
damaged Mashburn's land by taking the access to it and then had chosen
to repair the damage rather than to pay compensation for it. The repairing
took the form of taking the school's land and giving it to Mashburn.
The result is commendable although it represents a rather striking departure from the old maxim, so frequently quoted in the North Carolina
decisions, that the power of eminent domain granted by statute is to be
strictly construed. 4
A rough analogue is Austin v. Shaw, 235 N.C. 722, 71 S.E.2d 129 (1952), in
which the city was held within its powers to contribute funds for the construction
of a cross-line railroad track outside the city limits as a substitute for grade crossings within the city that were to be eliminated by the railroad at the city's order.
The city would normally have had no power to contribute to extra-territorial im1

provements.
52
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-19 (1964).
"See Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d 862, 883 (1968) ; Comment, Substitute Condemnation, 54 CAL. L. REv. 1097 (1966).
'See, e.g., State v. Core Banks Club Properties, Inc., 275 N.C. 328, 167 S.E.2d
385 (1969), in which the court found no legislative authority for the North Carolina
Department of Administration to condemn land for a federally owned park.
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AIRPORT EASEMENTS

The growth of air transportation and the advent of passenger jets
during the last decade 55 have given rise to serious conflict between airports
and owners of surrounding land. Owners may be disturbed5" and their
property values depreciated by the noise, vibration, and air pollution
resulting from flights overhead, flights nearby but not invading the landowner's airspace, or from warmups and other ground activities at the
airport. If the airport operator has the power of eminent domain, it is
perfectly possible for it to condemn the necessary interests, whether in fee
or by way of easement, to assure the airport immunity from liability
resulting from its activities. But airport authorities have rarely taken
the initiative to exercise this power except when necessary to condemn
a physical structure that interfered with the approach or takeoff pattern. T
Direct purchase or condemnation of easements for noise or overflights
generally has been avoided, probably because consistency would have required acquisitions over large land areas with resulting heavy expenditures. In general, airports would prefer not to publicize their liability, for
obvious reasons. If the aggrieved property owner seeks legal redress, he
may choose among several theories-including inverse condemnation,
trespass, and nuisance-depending on the circumstances and the precise
remedy that he wants.
Inverse Condemnation
The theory used most commonly and most successfully in other jurisdictions is inverse condemnation." The concept underlying this approach
" The shift to jets is illustrated by the drop in consumption of gasoline by domestic scheduled air carriers from 922 million gallons in 1960 to 223, million in 1967.
During the same period, those carriers increased their jet fuel consumption from

988 million gallons to 5,324 million. U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL

569 (1969).
" A vivid description of the impact of air operations on family life is found
in Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 309, 312, 391 P.2d 540, 543 (1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989 (1965). See also Hearings on H.R. 3400, H.R. 14146
Before the Subcomm. on Transportationand Aeronautics of the House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Comimerce, 81st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., ser. 90-35 (1968).
See, e.g., Greensboro-High Point Airport Authority v. Irvin, 2 N.C. App.
341, 163 S.E.2d 47 (1968), in which the airport sought an easement to cut trees
obstructing its approach path. The court affirmed an order restraining the cutting
of timber pending final resolution of the landowner's claim that the airport lacked
authority to condemn the easement. See also Vance County v. Royster, 271 N.C.
53, 155 S.E.2d 790 (1967). City and county airports derive their power of eminent
domain from N.C. GEN. STAT. § 63-5 (1965).
" Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84, rehearing denied, 369 U.S. 857
ABSTRACT OF TEE UNITED STATES
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is that if a governmental agency takes private property without the usual
formalities of an eminent-domain action, the owner is entitled to bring
his own action for compensation for the property taken. In doing so, he
is virtually conceding the power of the government to take his land and
is demanding the payment due him under the Constitution. In North
Carolina, no special procedures are set up by statute for the inversecondemnation suit; it is an ordinary civil action.5 9
That inverse condemnation would be available to a private owner injured by aircraft flights was first suggested by the North Carolina
Supreme Court in City of Charlotte v. Spratt.0 In this case the city
brought a condemnation action to acquire some of the defendant's land
in fee; by answer she attempted to make an additional claim for damages
for a flight easement that the city had allegedly taken over other land.
The court held that she could not appropriately claim the additional damages in the city's action, but suggested that she might proceed in a separate
action on inverse condemnation theory.
Recently the North Carolina Supreme Court has squarely held that
such a course is available to a landowner. In Hoyle v. City of Charlotte12
the court followed the lead of earlier United States Supreme Court cases
and permitted the owner to recover for diminution in value of his property resulting from low overflights. The case raises a number of problems intrinsic in the inverse-condemnation approach. The first and most
obvious is that only money damages can result from such an action. The
owner must admit that the airport's activities are legal and may complain
only of not having been compensated for their impact on his land. The
inverse-condemnation suit provides no forum for an assertion that the
airport should be required to abate or modify its activities. Thus the individual plaintiff may be fairly compensated by the judgment he wins, but
(1962) ; United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946), noted in Note, Aviation.-

Liability of Airport for Low Flying-Flights Through Airspace as Taking of an

Easement, 25 N.C.L. Rnv. 64 (1946) ; Palisades Citizens Ass'n v. Civil Aeronautics

Bd., 420 F.2d 188 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Trippe v. Port of New York Authority, 17

App. Div. 2d 472, 236 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1962). The literature in the field is vast.
See, e.g., Bohannon, Airport Easements, 54 VA. L. REv. 355 (1968); Kettelson,
Inverse Condemnation of Air Easements, 3 REAL PROP., PRO. & TR. J. 97 (1968).
" Carolina Beach Fishing Pier, Inc. v. Town of Carolina Beach, 274 N.C. 362,

372, 163 S.E.2d 363, 370-71 (1968); Midgett v. North Carolina State Hwy.
Comm'n, 260 N.C. 241, 249, 132 S.E.2d 599, 607 (1963).
263 N.C. 656, 140 S.E.2d 341 (1965).
"276 N.C. 292, 172 S.E.2d 1 (1970).
"E.g., Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States v.
Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
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the rest of society, and particularly other owners disturbed by aircraft,
get no benefit at all from the plaintiff's efforts. Moreover, the judgment
won by the plaintiff may not be truly adequate since the trier of facts will
usually conclude that the land in question still has some residual value
with the flight easement imposed upon it. Thus the owner will rarely be
awarded the land's full value in fee.0 3 Yet as a practical matter, the market
for the land may be so constricted as to be negligible.
Other problems arise with the inverse-condemnation theory. It is,
of course, available only against an entity that itself has the power of
eminent domain; thus it is useless against most privately-owned airfields.
Indeed, the question of who is a proper defendant might have been a
serious one although it has not turned out to be so. The United States
Supreme Court rejected the argument that the aircraft operators or the federal aviation authorities were the only proper defendants and held that the
owner of the airport itself was the "taking" agency. 4 The North Carolina
court in Hoyle followed this reasoning.6 Another difficulty arises if
the flights in question do not physically invade the plaintiff's theoretical
air space, but pass to one side. Obviously the noise and pollution can
be equally disturbing, yet some courts have held that if the flights are not
overflights, no "taking" by eminent domain can occur. 6 Hoyle did not
raise this problem since the plaintiff was careful to allege and prove actual
overflights ;67 and the citation by the North Carolina court of cases from
other jurisdictions that disregard the overflight-sideflight distinction s
" For example, in Hoyle the plaintiff's witnesses testified that the unencumbered value of the property was in the range of fifty thousand dollars and its value
subject to the overflights was about five thousand dollars. The jury verdict was
16,800 dollars, which was probably excessively low even considering the normal
bias of witnesses for plaintiffs.
" Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962). Yet great particularity in
pleading may be required to subject the airport to liability. The Georgia cases,
for example, have required the plaintiff to allege that the aircraft were under
the control of the airport, that the airport made the overflights necessary, and
exactly what actions of the airport operator made them necessary. Atlanta v.
Donald, 221 Ga. 135, 143 S.E.2d 737, rev'g, 111 Ga. App. 339, 141 S.E.2d 560
(1965) ; Dyer v. Atlanta, 219 Ga. 538, 134 S.E.2d 585 (1964).
65276 N.C. at 300-02, 172 S.E.2d at 6-7.
' Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 955 (1963) ; Ferguson v. Keene, 108 N.H. 409, 238 A.2d 1 (1968), noted in
Note, Airspace-Aircraft Noise-Inverse Condemnation Absent Overflight, 8
NAT. REs. J. 561 (1968).
07 276 N.C. at 296, 172 S.E.2d at 3.
8
Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962); Martin
v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 309, 391 P.2d 540, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989
(1965) (dictum).
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may indicate the court's willingness to find a taking without a physical
invasion of plaintiff's airspace.6 9
The court in Hoyle treated the time of the taking as of considerable
importance since damages must be evaluated as of that date.70 But in
cases involving airports, the time of taking may be very difficult to ascertain. For example, in Hoyle overflights of the plaintiff's property began
in 1937 when the Douglas Municipal Airport opened. However, the
plaintiff testified that it was not until 1962 or 1963, when commercial
jets began to use the field frequently, that he was first inconvenienced
and his property first devalued by the flights. The action was commenced
in 1967. The trial court's jury instructions were based on the assumption
that the proper compensation was the difference between the value of the
property without the flight easement and the value subject to the flight
easement on the date of trial.7 ' The supreme court reversed and ordered
a new trial; it held that the date of taking was 1962-when the use by
commercial jets began-and that damages should be assessed as the
difference in value with and without the (jet?) overflights on that date.
The latent problem in cases such as Hoyle is that of the "creeping"
taking. Suppose at the new trial the plaintiff alleges and offers proof
that the taking occurred in 1962. The airport then offers proof that, in
fact, propeller-driven aircraft had been flying over the plaintiff's property
for many years prior to 1962 and had already depreciated his property by
twenty-five per cent. Assume that the increment of depreciation resulting
from the flights of jets beginning in 1962 was an additional twenty-five
per cent. Since the measure of damages is the difference in value before
and after the taking, will the plaintiff be limited to recovery of only
twenty-five per cent of the property's unencumbered value? To forestall
such a result, the plaintiff would be well advised to take two precautions:
first, to allege and prove a series of takings, one occurring each time the
airport's operations changed so as to result in additional disturbance to
his property; and second, to define carefully the scope of the easement
" See also McKinney v. City of High Point, 239 N.C. 232, 79 S.E.2d 730
(1954); McKinney v. City of High Point, 237 N.C. 66, 74 S.E.2d 440 (1953),
which both hold that inverse condemnation need not be based on physical invasion
despite the "respectable authority" to the contrary. The "taking" in these two
cases resulted from the reflection of the sun's rays onto the plaintiff's property
from a water tank erected by the city.
70 276 N.C. at 307, 172 S.E.2d at 11.
"'The trial court's position seems to be supported by Wagner v. Town of
Conover, 200 N.C. 82, 156 S.E. 167 (1930), despite the headnote to the contrary
in the official report of that case.
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alleged to have been taken by each change. This procedure is admittedly
cumbersome, but it appears necessary so long as the courts adhere to the
necessity for establishing a definite date of taking.
Such an approach by the plaintiff raises the possibility that if some
flights had commenced as early as twenty years prior to the filing of the
inverse-condemnation action, the airport would have acquired a prescriptive easement to the extent of those early flights. 2 Another disadvantage to the plaintiff of the "serial-taking" approach is that some
of the takings will be assessed at the value of the property in an earlier era
when the dollar's purchasing power and the generalized demand for land
were much different than today. 3 The plaintiff will apparently be entitled to interest from the date of each taking,74 but six per cent per
annum"5 may not be sufficient to compensate for inflation and the loss in
productivity of the property over the intrevening years.
If plaintiff is successful in an inverse-condemnation action against the
airport and later the overflights become even more onerous, can he file a
new action on the ground that the easement for which the airport previously paid is being surcharged? Such a case is not improbable: the sonic
boom of the supersonic transport (SST) may make today's jets seem
quite innocuous! A later recovery should be permitted, 6 and a few cases
have so held. 77 To preserve this remedy plaintiff should exert his best
" The court in its opinion in Hoyle assumed that a prescriptive easement could
be acquired in this manner. 276 N.C. at 307, 172 S.E.2d at 11. The twenty-year
period is taken by analogy from the adverse-possession statute, N.C. GEN. STAT.

§ 1-40 (1969). See Survey of North Carolina Supreme Court Decisions 1952, 32

N.C.L. REv. 379, 482 (1954).
" During the 1960-1969 decade, prices of typical homesites rose ninety-five per
cent nationwide. The increase was 173 per cent in Charlotte, North Carolina, and
sixty-nine per cent in Greensboro, North Carolina. U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT,
March 9, 1970, at 54.
" Red Springs City Bd. of Educ. v. McMillan, 250 N.C. 485, 108 S.E.2d 895
(1959) ; De Bruhl v. North Carolina State Hwy. Comm'n, 247 N.C. 671, 102 S.E.2d
229 (1958). See Phay, The Eminent Domain Procedure of North Carolina: The
Need for Legislative Action, 45 N.C.L. REv. 587, 634 (1967).
N.C. GEN. STAT. §24-1 (1965).
"' The problem is quite analogous to a series of North Carolina cases in which
the landowner had conveyed a right-of-way easement to a railroad that in turn
permitted a communications company to install poles and lines along the right-ofway. The owner was permitted to recover permanent damages from the communications firm for the additional burden on the easement. Query v. Postal
Telegraph-Cable Co., 178 N.C. 639, 101 S.E. 390 (1919); Teeter v. Postal
Telegraph-Cable Co., 172 N.C. 783, 90 S.E. 941 (1916) ; Hodges v. Western Union
Tel. Co., 133 N.C. 225, 45 S.E. 572 (1903).
" Aaron v. United States, 340 F.2d 655 (Ct. Cl. 1964) ; Avery v. United States,
330 F.2d 640 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
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efforts to see that the judgment order in his first suit, as well as the
pleadings and proof supporting it, make perfectly clear the scope of the
easement taken by the airport to the date of the trial. The scope of the
easement should be defined, perhaps, by the type of aircraft, altitude, and
noise level in decibels. Since the plaintiff's recovery is limited by the use
being made of his property at the trial date, he should see that it is
made clear that the airport has acquired no greater right of use.
Trespass and Nuisance
In addition to inverse condemnation, two other theories have been
utilized by landowners aggrieved by airport operatons-trespass and
nuisance. Both of these approaches have two advantages to the plaintiff
over inverse condemnation. They can be asserted against non-governmental airport operators, and they may support equitable relief as well
as damages; thus these two theories provide the potential for some relief
to other members of the community in addition to the plaintiff.
Trespass was specifically recognized as an appropriate alternative by
the supreme court in Hoyle;" the language is dictum, but, even so, is
quite significant since the court made some point in its opinion of deference to the regulations of the Federal Aviation Agency, which permit
flights lower than five hundred feet over congested areas "when necessary
for takeoff or landing .

.

. ."" The wording of the regulations might

have been thought to make intrusions into private airspace by craft
landing or taking off non-actionable in trespass,"0 but the court in Hoyle
decided otherwise. However, an action in trespass is no panacea for the
plaintiff. It is likely to be quite difficult to convince a property-minded
judge that a trespass can exist through "mere" sideflights but with no
invasion by aircraft of the plantiff's airspace; s ' the task, however, may
not be impossible. For a possible analogy, the plaintiff might cite two
North Carolina cases in which the court was willing to treat air pollution
82
as a trespass.
A plaintiff in a trespass action might frame his prayer for monetary
relief in two alternative ways: his first option might be to seek "temporary"
276 N.C. at 307, 172 S.E.2d at 11.

14 C.F.R. § 91.79 (1969), authorized by 49
88See
Newark v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 159
81

U.S.C. § 1301(24) (1964).
F. Supp. 750 (D.NJ. 1958).

See, e.g., id.

szIvester v. City of Winston-Salem, 215 N.C. 1, 1 S.E.2d 88 (1939) ; Dayton v.
City of Asheville, 185 N.C. 12, 115 S.E. 827 (1923).
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damages for a continuing trespass. 3 In an aircraft-overflight case, for
example, the plaintiff might allege business losses or mental injury
computed on an annual basis. His recovery in any given year for damages
suffered to that date would not preclude a later suit for additional damages
if the overflights continued and he sustained still more injury. An important restriction on recovery of temporary damages for continuing trespass is the three-year statute of limitations,"' which would probably be
held to bar any recovery for injury occurring more than three years prior
to the action's commencement.8 5 The statute, on the other hand, probably
would not be construed to bar all recovery for continuing flights merely because the first flights began more than three years before commencement
of the suit.86
The other option open to the plaintiff would be to seek permanent
damages for a "permanent" trespass.87 The damages assessed under this
theory would reflect depreciation in the value of the property; they would
give the defendant, in effect, an easement to continue his activities
without future liability. The result is the virtual equivalent of inverse
condemnation, although there may be significant differences in the application of the statute of limitations and the method of computing damages.
The court deciding Hoyle stated that the action in that case would have
been barred by the three-year statute of limitations if it had been brought on,
a trespass theory. 8 If the court's statement refers to permanent trespass,
it seems impossible to reconcile with many earlier trespass cases involving
air and stream pollution and intermittent flooding of land."9 The application of the statute of limitations in these earlier cases may be summarized
as follows: if defendant has committed no wrongful acts within three
years of the commencement of the action, the claim is arguably totally
" See Dobbs, Trespass to Land in North CarolinaPartII. Remedies for Tres-

pass, 47 N.C.L. REv. 334, 344 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Dobbs] and cases cited
therein.
8
'N.C. GEm.

STAT. § 1-52(3) (1969).
" Cf. Love v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 221 N.C. 469, 20 S.E.2d 337 (1942) ;
Davenport v. Drainage Dist. of Pitt County, 221 N.C. 237, 19 S.E.2d 880 (1941) ;
Hooper v. Carr Lumber Co., 215 N.C. 308, 1 S.E.2d 818 (1939).

:'Cf. Qaldey v. Texas Co., 236 N.C. 751, 73 S.E.2d 898 (1953).
8 See Dobbs at 344-68. There is some thought that permanent damages are
available to the"plaintiff only if the defendant is a public or quasi-public agency.
See Morrow v. Florence Mills, 181 N.C. 423, 107 S.E. 445 (1921); Webb v.
Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co., 170 N.C. 662, 87 S.E. 633 (1916).
88276 N.C. at 307, 172 S.E.2d at 11.
8'See cases cited notes 90 & 91 infra.
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barred. ° If the wrongful acts have continued to take place into the
three-year period prior to the commencment of the action, even though
they were begun long before, plaintiff may get permanent damages computed as the difference between the value of his land at the date of trial
and its value three years before the action was commenced." This
method of computation, it will be observed, is radically different than that
used in Hoyle under the inverse-condemnation theory. In Hoyle the
court insisted on the fixing of a date for the taking and computed damages
as the difference between the encumbered and unencumbered values on
that date. It must be conceded that several North Carolina cases involving
trespass support the method of computation used in Hoyle. 2 The approach
in Hoyle would be more generous to the plaintiff in many, but not necessarily all, situations; and when the three-year computation is more favorable in a case involving taking by an airport, there seems to be no basis
for denying it. This method has an advantage over the technique used
in Hoyle in that it avoids the rigmarole of pleading and proving a series
of takings, each more onerous than those before, when the airport's operations have steadily increased in magnitude, but in order to be considered
under this approach, the increase must have occurred during the last
three years.
It is apparent that permanent damages for trespass are frequently
much more attractive to the plaintiff than temporary damages. Whether
they can be recovered depends on whether the trespass results in a condition permanent in nature."3 A permanent condition should not be an
"0 See Teseneer v. Henrietta Mills Co., 209 N.C. 615, 184 S.E. 535 (1936)

(flooding). But see Love v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 221 N.C. 469, 20 S.E.2d

337 (1942) and Query v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 178 N.C. 639, 101 S.E. 390
(1919), in which the court treated the three-year statute as totally inapplicable to
actions for permanent-trespass damages and applied only the twenty-year prescriptive
period.
"1Teseneer v. Henrietta Mills Co., 209 N.C. 615, 184 S.E. 535 (1936) ; Lightner v. City of Raleigh, 206 N.C. 496, 174 S.E. 272 (1934) (stream pollution).
See Oakley v. Texas Co., 236 N.C. 751, 73 S.E.2d 898 (1953) (statute of limitations issue only). See also Ivester v. City of Winston-Salem, 215 N.C. 1, 1 S.E.2d
88 (1939) (air pollution), in which the court applied a similar measure of damages
under a city charter's two-year limitations period.
" Clinard v. Town of Kernersville, 215 N.C. 745, 3 S.E.2d 267 (1939) (stream
pollution). The approach in Hoyle is more commonly used when the trespass
is in the nature of a structure built on the plaintiff's land. E.g., Lambeth v. Southern Power Co., 152 N.C. 371, 67 S.E. 921 (1910) (power line installed on plaintiff's land). See also Parker v. Norfolk & C.R.R., 119 N.C. 677, 685, 25 S.E. 722,
725 (1896) (flooding).
" Rhodes v. City of Durham, 165 N.C. 679, 680, 81 S.E. 938, 939 (1914). See
Dobbs at 345. See also Wiseman v. Tomrich Constr. Co., 250 N.C. 521, 109 S.E.2d
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especially difficult matter to establish in a case in which the airport hag
invested in permanent runways since their directions establish flight
patterns to a substantial extent. Plaintiff can argue that neither climatic
conditions nor technological innovations are likely to bring a material
diminution in flights over or near his property. There is some authority
that, unless the defendant consents, the plaintiff may not require permanent
damages from a defendant lacking the power of eminent domain."
Whether this proposition is true, the defendant in many cases will prefer
to have permanent damages assessed so that it will be guaranteed freedom
from later liability for the continuation of its present operations.
In principle, an injunctive order should also be available as an alternative remedy to a plaintiff in a trespass action. But the courts have enjoined trespasses only with reluctance,' 5 and cases of disturbances by airports do not seem to be very promising ones for injunctions. In the
trespass area, injunctions have not been thought of as especially flexible
devices. The issue is simply: should the acts be enjoined? As a matter
of practical politics, it is very difficult to imagine a superior court judge's
enjoining the use of an important runway at a major airport. Several
techniques may be used by the court to avoid issuing an injunction. First
and most obvious, an injunction is a discretionary remedy requiring the
judge to balance the respective harm and benefit that would accrue to the
parties-and perhaps to the public. Second, the court may find that the
plaintiff's remedy at law is adequateY6 (Such a finding may simply be
another way of saying that the court is unwilling to subordinate the interests of the defendant and the public to those of the plaintiff.)
Another obstacle to the plaintiff who seeks an injunction may be the
defendant's insistence that the court assess permanent damages instead.
There is some authority that at least a defendant having eminent domain
powers may entirely avoid an injunction by demanding that it be allowed
to pay permanent damages. 7 A more accurate interpretation of the cases
248 (1959), in which the court suggested that the act damaging the plaintiff must
already have been completed in order for him to recover permanent damages. But
even under this rule, plaintiff can argue that the original construction of the
runways was the significant "act."
Perhaps none of the analysis is especially meaningful since Hoyle is clear
authority that plaintiff can recover permanent damages by casting his complaint
in inverse-condemnation terms.
" Clinard v. Town of Kernersville, 215 N.C. 745, 3 S.E.2d 267 (1939).
" See Dobbs at 351-59.

Id. at 354.
See Rhodes v. City of Durham, 165 N.C. 679, 680, 81 S.E. 938, 939 (1914).
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is probably that even if the defendant has general condemnation powers,
an injunction should issue if, on balance, the public interest would not be
seriously disserved.9 8 But this test might be difficult to satisfy if the
contemplated injunction would seriously cripple an airport's operation.
To a plaintiff seriously interested in abating, to the extent practical,
the annoyance caused by aircraft, a nuisance theory would be considerably
more promising than one of trespass. Although the nuisance-trespass
distinction has not always been clearly observed in North Carolina, the
courts in nuisance cases are accustomed to much greater flexibility in
fashioning orders:
Where a nuisance is private and arises out of the manner of operating
a legitimate business or undertaking, a court of equity will, of course,
do no more than point to the nuisance and decree adoption of methods
calculated to eliminate the injurious features ....

In other words, a

court of equity will not outlaw the entire operation if a decree restricting the time or method of operation will eliminate the injury. But
if regulation will not abate the nuisance, the entire operation will be
enjoined. 99
A "regulatory" injunction makes a great deal of sense in a case involving
disturbance by an airport. For example, the court's order might require
that the use of a particular runway be limited to certain types of aircraft
or that specific air-traffic patterns be observed to minimize noise or that
aircraft be fitted with noise-suppression devices. There is no need that
such an order be final. The court could retain jurisdiction, could require
periodic reports and the monitoring of noise and pollution levels with
scientific equipment, and could reserve the right to modify its decree if
it proved unworkable or if circumstances changed. Implementing this
sort of decree would require an energetic judge, ingenious counsel, and
probably the employment of well-qualified expert witnesses. But it seems
more likely than any other judicial technique to achieve a practical
accommodation of the competing public and private interests.
Other factors also commend the nuisance theory to the plaintiff's at" See id. See also Anderson v. Town of Waynesville, 203 N.C. 37, 164 S.E.
583 (1932). In these cases the court spoke of the injunctive power being withheld

if "the interest of the public is of... an exigent nature." Both cases rely on the
doctrine of nuisance, but the same principle would probably apply to the issuance
of an injunction against trespass.
"' Hooks v. International Speedways, Inc., 263 N.C. 686, 691, 140 S.E.2d 387,
391 (1965). Despite the grand talk about regulation, the court approved a blanket
injunction against construction of an auto race track near a country church.
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torney. A 1949 case, Barrierv. Troutman,' provides concrete authority
for the proposition that an airport may be operated in such a manner as
to constitute a private nuisance, that the plaintiff's remedy at law may
be inadequate, and that injunction is an appropriate remedy. In Barrier
the trial court enjoined the use of a particular runway, at least in the
direction of the plaintiff's property. Apparently the airport made no
effort to persuade the court that a less heroic sanction would have been
sufficient. The impact of such an order could well be disastrous to a
small private airport and could work much hardship on a larger installation.
Perhaps because the airport in Barrier was privately operated, the
defense attorneys made no motion that permanent damages be assessed
and that the airport be given a perpetual easement over the plaintiff's
land. Such a motion seems generally more difficult to support when the
injunctive alternative is a "regulatory" order leaving relatively unimpaired
the public-service function of the airport. Indeed, it is possible that the
option to pay permanent damages in lieu of an injunction is simply
not open to any defendant against whom an injunction for nuisance is
sought.101 In any event, the injunctive alternative seems a much more
realistic possibility when it will not have the effect of closing down the
airport. 0 2 Application of the statute of limitations to an injunctive action
appears to be more favorable to the plaintiff than its application to an
action for damages; arguably the enjoining of a nuisance is barred only by
the twenty-year prescriptive period.10 3
10.231

N.C. 47, 55 S.E.2d 923 (1949).

"I1 See Anderson v. Town of Waynesville, 203 N.C. 37, 164 S.E. 583 (1932) (lake
pollution by sewage discharge) :
The power of eminent domain does not imply the power to condemn
property for unlawful purposes, such as the creation of a private nuisance.
Such an undertaking is subject in proper cases to equitable restraint....
A osystem of drainage which discharges raw and untreated sewage into
water used by a multitude of people even for a limited period cannot be
regarded of such an exigent nature as to deny relief by abatement when
irreparable damage is done. The plaintiffs, therefore, have not lost their
right to insist upon an abatement of the alleged nuisance.
Id. at 46, 164 S.E. at 587.
The same rationale could apply readily to an airport being operated as a nuisance.
Both sewage disposal and air transportation are in the public interest, but neither
should be free of equitable regulation at the instance of injured landowners.
...
Both permanent damages and an injunction may be appropriately sought in a
nuisance action. Poovey v. City of Hickory, 210 N.C. 630, 188 S.E. 78 (1936)
(stream pollution).
Anderson v. Town of Waynesville, 203 N.C. 37, 164 S.E. 583 (1932); cf.
...

790

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.48

Perhaps the blanket injunction approved in Barrier should not be
taken as too serious an indication of present judicial attitudes; the case
was decided over twenty years ago in an era when commercial air transportation had neither the economic importance nor the public support that
it enjoys today. The case involved a small private flying field that was
not a part of a major metropolitan area and that probably handled no
scheduled commercial flights. Yet the principles of nuisance and trespass
should provide formidable weapons for a plaintiff's attorney today, provided he is willing to grapple with conflicting lines of authority on such
matters as the computation of damages, the right of the defendant to
demand an assessment of permanent damages in lieu of an injunction, and
the statute of limitations. The advantage of being able to secure specific
relief for his client may well justify the attorney's additional effort.
Love v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 221 N.C. 469, 20 S.E.2d 337 (1942) ; Query v.
Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 178 N.C. 639, 101 S.E. 390 (1919).

